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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. : 
ERNESTO ALVEREZ, : Case No. 20040059-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
SUMMARY 
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Alverez's motion to suppress because the 
officers exceeded the scope justifying their initial level-two detention of Mr. Alverez 
without reasonable articulable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. Under the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, which properly includes 
consideration of the factor of the officers' accusatory questions and statements, a 
reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave. However, even if 
reasonable suspicion existed, the State failed to establish that officers had a "clear 
indication" that drugs would be found in Mr. Alverez's mouth. The State also failed to 
establish that exigent circumstances existed justifying the unreasonable force used to 
search Mr. Alverez. 
Therefore, Mr. Alverez respectfully asks this Court to reverse the trial court's 
denial of his motion to suppress and reverse his conviction. 
POINT I. THE OFFICERS CONDUCTED A LEVEL-TWO DETENTION OF 
MR. ALVEREZ WHEN QUESTIONING HIM REGARDING THE LACK OF 
INSURANCE ON THE VEHICLE HE WAS DRIVING. 
A level-two "seizure under the fourth amendment occurs when a reasonable 
person, in view of all the circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave." 
Salt Lake City v. Ray. 2000 UT App 55, f 11, 998 P.2d 274. "Important to the 
determination [of whether the officers were engaged in a level-two encounter] is whether 
[Mr. Alverez] remained, not in the spirit of cooperation with the officers' investigation, 
but because he believed he [was] not free to leave." State v. Struhs , 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). The State argues in its response brief 
that the officers only engaged Mr. Alverez in a level-one detention because "nothing in 
[the officers'] conduct would have suggested to a reasonable person that [he] was not 
'free "to disregard [them] and go about his business."'" State Brief 8. However, the State 
fails to address the fact that the officers initially detained Mr. Alverez regarding the lack 
of insurance on the vehicle he was driving. See State Brief 6-14. Yet, as the State 
pointed out, "Utah law makes it a class B misdemeanor for a driver to knowingly operate 
an uninsured motor vehicle on the highways of the state. Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-302 
(1998)." State Brief 15 n. 8. An affirmative statement by a police officer that you are 
violating a state law is not a circumstance that "would . . . suggest[] to a reasonable 
person that [he is] . . . free to disregard . . . and go about his business." State Brief 8 
(internal quotations omitted). This alone indicates that Mr. Alverez was seized for 
2 
purposes implicating the Fourth Amendment the moment the officers questioned him 
regarding the vehicle's lack of insurance. 
Other factors present which support a level-two seizure and that Mr. Alverez 
"remained, not in the spirit of cooperation with the officers'] investigation,"1 but 
because the officers' "conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the 
person was not free [to leave] or otherwise terminate the encounter" were also present. 
State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ^ }12, 17 P.3d 1135 (quotations and citations omitted) 
(Hansen I), reversed in part on other grounds, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650 (Hansen II). 
These factors include a "stealthy approach,"2 "failure to issue a warning or citation before 
engaging in additional questioning,"3 "a coercive show of authority,"4 "blocking the path 
to Mr. Alverez's] vehicle,"5 and "accusatory" or "investigatory questions."6 As argued in 
Appellant's Opening Brief, the officers used a "stealthy approach" in confronting Mr. 
Alverez. See Appellant's Opening Brief 14-15. Both officers waited for Mr. Alverez 
behind a full-sized van parked next to the vehicle he was driving. R. 88:5-6. As Mr. 
Alverez "came around the van," both uniformed officers stepped out from behind the van 
1
 State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d at 1227. 
2 Idat l228. 
3Hansen II, 2002 UT 125 at | 4 1 . 
4I4 
5Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1227-28. 
6Hansen I, 2000 UT App 353 at f 14. 
3 
and confronted him as he approached the vehicle.7 Standing right next to the vehicle, the 
officers subjected Mr. Alverez to accusatory questions and statements regarding the 
vehicle's lack of insurance and the officers' hunches that the vehicle was suspected of 
being involved in drug dealings. R. 88:6, 15-17. The accusatory statements made by the 
officers were not the type that would communicate to a reasonable person that he was 
free to disregard and "go about his . . . business." Hansen I, 2000 UT App 353 at f^ 12. 
The officers never indicated how they planned on resolving the vehicle's lack of 
insurance, never asked Mr. Alverez his name or for his identification or even if the 
vehicle belonged to him. See Id., at f 15; see also Appellant's Opening Brief 14-17. The 
State argues that Hansen, where this Court considered the officer's failure to address one 
of the reasons for the initial stop in determining whether the defendant remained in a 
level-two seizure, does not apply because Hansen was a case that "considered whether a 
level-two detention de-escalated to a level-one consensual encounter." State Brief 9. 
However, the factors used by this Court in determining whether the detention in Hansen 
had de-escalated are the very same factors used to determine whether a level-one 
encounter has escalated to a level-two seizure. See Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 
55, [^11 (citing same factors used in Hansen to determine whether level-one encounter 
7The State correctly points out that the record reflects that it was Mr. Alverez who 
"came around the van" not the officers as indicated in Appellant's Opening Brief. See 
Appellant's Opening Brief 14. However, Mr. Alverez maintains that regardless of who 
"came around the van," the officers' used a stealthy approach in confronting him. 
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escalated to a level-two); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (using 
same factors to determine level of detention). 
The State also argues that this Court's consideration of "statement[s] by police 
that an investigation has focused on the individual" in determining the level of the 
detention is "inconsistent with holdings of the United States Supreme Court." State Brief 
12. The State's argument is erroneous. Supreme Court has held that "a seizure does not 
occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few 
questions[, s]o long as a reasonable person would feel free 'to disregard the police and 
go about his business.'" Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). "[T]he crucial test 
is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the 
police conduct would 'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at 
liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.'" Bostick, 501 U.S at 437 
(citation omitted). This is the test Utah appellate courts also adhere to when determining 
whether an officer's encounter with a defendant implicates the Fourth Amendment. Ray, 
2000 UT App 55 at f^jl 1 (M[A] level one encounter becomes a level two stop . . . 'when a 
reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to 
leave.'"); State v. Higgins, 837 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (same); State v. Carter, 
812 P.2d 460, 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (same). Consideration of the factor of 
investigatory or accusatory statements made by officers in determining whether under the 
totality of the circumstances a reasonable person would feel free to leave is consistent 
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with U.S. Supreme Court law. In fact, in Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491 (1983), two of 
the factors the Supreme Court considered in the totality of the circumstances test to 
determine that the defendant was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes were that "the 
officers identified themselves as narcotics agents, [and] told Royer that he was suspected 
of transporting narcotics." Id. at at 501-02. 
The State cites Bostick and I.N.S. v. Delgado. 466 U.S. 210 (1984), in support of 
its assertion that "[t]he Supreme Court has long 'endorsed' the proposition that police 
officers can approach individuals as to whom they have no reasonable suspicion and ask 
them potentially incriminating questions." State Brief 12. The State's argument is 
misplaced in this case. Appellant does not argue that the officers engaged in "potentially 
incriminating questions" but instead that the officers engaged in accusatory questioning 
and made accusatory statements which indicated to Mr. Alverez that he was suspected of 
being involved in criminal activity and not free to leave. Therefore, Mr. Alverez was 
seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
In Bostick, two officers boarded a bus that the defendant was on and without 
reasonable suspicion "asked to inspect his ticket and identification." 501 U.S. at 431. 
After finding the defendant's ticket and identification "unremarkable" the officers 
returned them to him. Id "However, the two police officers persisted and explained 
their presence as narcotics agents on the lookout for illegal drugs." IcL at 431-32. "In 
pursuit of that aim," the officers asked the defendant if he would consent to a search of 
6 
his bags. Ici at 432. Nowhere in the case does it indicate that the officers accused the 
defendant of being involved in drug activity. The facts merely indicate that the officers 
would "routinely approach individuals . . . and ask them potentially incriminating 
questions." Id. at 431. However, the case does not indicate that the officers actually 
accused the defendant of carrying luggage suspected of containing illegal drugs. 
In Delgado, INS agents conducted factory surveys pursuant to search warrants 
obtained based on a showing of probable cause that there were several illegal aliens 
employed at this particular factory.8 466 U.S. at 211-12. During the surveys, "the agents 
approached employees and . . . asked them from one to three questions relating to their 
citizenship." Id. at 212. In the applicable reasoning to this case, the Supreme Court cited 
to its decision in Rover, stating Rover "plainly implies that interrogation relating to one's 
identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth 
Amendment seizure. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 (emphasis added); compare Brown v. 
Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (officers violated Fourth Amendment by detaining defendant 
without reasonable suspicion after he refused to identify himself). However, as indicated 
supra, in Rover, the Supreme Court considered the officers' statement "that an 
investigation has focused on [the defendant]"9 in the totality of the circumstances in 
determining whether "a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 
8Agents conducted one of the three surveys with the employer's consent. 
9Carter, 812 P.2d at 463. 
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leave." Rover, 460 U.S. at 502. Thus, while the Supreme Court has held that "mere 
police questioning does not constitute a seizure," that questioning cannot "convey a 
message that compliance with [the officers'] requests is required," which is exactly the 
message conveyed by accusatory statements and questions. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35. 
Moreover, similar to this Court's consideration of the manner or types of 
questions asked by officers in determining the level of detention, other jurisdictions have 
held that consideration of an officer's accusatory statements or questions are a relevant 
factor under the totality of circumstances in determining whether a defendant was seized. 
U.S. v. Little. 60 F.3d 708, 712 (10th Cir. 1995) (consideration of "[a]ccusatory, 
persistent, and intrusive" questioning as a factor in the totality of the circumstances test is 
proper); U.S. v. Saperstein; 723 F.2d 1221, 1226 (6th Cir. 1983) (Definite statement by 
DEA agent that he had information about defendant and his "probable activities as a drug 
courier" was a factor to consider within the totality of the circumstances); U.S. v. Millan, 
912 F.2d 1014, 1016 (8 th Cir. 1990) (officer showing his badge for a second time along 
with his questioning and statement that he suspected defendant of carrying drugs in his 
pocket turned consensual encounter into a Terry stop); State v. Jason, 2 P.3d 856, 862 
(N.M. 2000) ("[QJuestions asked in an 'accusatory, persistent, and intrusive' manner can 
make 'an otherwise voluntary encounter . . . coercive.'" (citation omitted)); In re J.G, 726 
A.2d 948, 953 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (recognizing that "[generally, courts 
throughout the country have ruled that a field inquiry becomes a Terry stop upon 
8 
'unsupported outright accusations of criminal activity.5") 
Thus, when determining the level of an encounter an officer has engaged an 
individual in, it is proper for this Court to use an officer's statement that an investigation 
has focused on the individual or an officer's accusatory questions or statements as a 
factor under the totality of the circumstances test. Consideration of this factor is 
consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent as well as case law from other 
jurisdictions. In this case, the totality of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Alverez's 
encounter with the officers indicate that "a reasonable person would have believed that 
he was not free to leave." U.S. v. Mendenhalh 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Therefore, 
Mr. Alverez was seized for purposes implicating the Fourth Amendment. 
POINT II. OFFICERS DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE SUSPICION TO 
EXCEED THE SCOPE JUSTIFYING THEIR INITIAL DETENTION. 
As Appellant indicated in his Opening Brief, reasonable suspicion existed 
regarding the lack of insurance on the vehicle Mr. Alverez was driving, allowing the 
officers to engage him in a level-two detention. Appellant's Opening Brief 13-17. 
However, while the officers were justified in detaining Mr. Alverez to question him 
about the vehicle's lack of insurance, the expanded scope of their detention must have 
been "supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity." State v. 
Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). 
The State argues that the officers' further detention was supported by reasonable 
suspicion that Mr. Alverez "was selling or buying drugs." State Brief 14-20. As argued 
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in Appellant's Opening Brief, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter 
consisted of an uncorroborated "narcotics intelligence report" based on an unknown 
source that the vehicle Mr. Alverez was driving was "possibly" dealing drugs at a 
location twenty blocks away. See Appellant's Brief 20-26. The officers never 
established whether Mr. Alverez was in fact the owner of the vehicle in question. The 
next factor consisted of two short stay visits to a complex that officers did not know 
whether or not Mr. Alverez resided. Moreover, the officers did not have any specific 
information that drugs were being sold from anywhere in the complex and did not 
observe any conduct that would have indicated drugs were being sold there. IcL_ at 26-29. 
The final factors were a bottle of water and a facsimile of Jesus Malverde observed 
inside the vehicle which the trial court gave "very little weight." Id. at 19; see also 
Addendum. 
"None of these factors, either singly or in aggregate, necessarily indicate 
wrongdoing as opposed to innocent actions by [Mr. Alverez]." State v. Sykes , 840 P.2d 
825, 828 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Nor, do the totality of these factors create a 
"particularized and objective basis for suspecting" that Mr. Alverez was engaged in 
criminal activity. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215-16 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(quotations and citation omitted). Therefore, the officers' questions regarding drugs 
exceeded the permissible scope of the initial detention in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. See Appellant's Opening Brief 16-29 for a complete analysis of this point. 
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POINT III. THE OFFICERS VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
WHEN THEY FORCIBLY CONDUCTED A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF 
MR. ALVEREZ WITHOUT THE NECESSARY SHOWING OF EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The State argues that Mr. Alverez's "behavior following the questioning was 
sufficient, in light of the other information, to establish probable cause to believe he was 
concealing drugs in his mouth." State Brief 22. As argued in Appellant's Opening Brief, 
neither the information the officers had before the detention nor anything in Mr. Alverez 
behavior during the detention, gave the officers a "clear indication" that drugs would be 
found in his mouth. See Appellant's Opening Brief 31-34; see also State v. Hodson, 866 
P.2d 556, 560 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Hodson I), reversed on other grounds. 907 P.2d 
1155 (Utah 1995) ("cClear indication' requires that there be probable cause to believe 
that evidence will be found." (citation omitted)). 
In Hodson I, this Court upheld the trial court's conclusion that there was probable 
cause to believe that evidence of drugs would be found in the defendant's mouth. 866 
P.2d at 560. The totality of the circumstances in Hodson consisted of the following: (1) a 
police informant "had agreed to arrange to purchase heroin from [the] defendant; (2) [the 
police informant] gave a prearranged signal indicating the drug transaction was 
complete;" and (3) one of the officers observed the defendant throw "something into his 
mouth when the officers approached with their lights flashing." I JL Hence, in Hodson, 
the officer had prior knowledge that an informant had agreed to purchase drugs from the 
defendant, received a "prearranged signal" that the defendant had in fact sold drugs to the 
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informant and one of the officers actually saw the defendant throw "something into his 
mouth" when the defendant realized that the officers were present. 
In this case, the only information the officers had prior to detaining Mr. Alverez 
was that the vehicle he was driving was listed on a narcotics intelligence report as 
possibly dealing drugs twenty blocks away, two short stay visits to a complex where Mr. 
Alverez may reside, a bottle of water and a facsimile of Jesus Malverde. After Mr. 
Alverez was detained, he responded to the officers' accusatory questions and statements 
without any difficulty. Officer Walling did not notice any unsightly or unusual bulges in 
Mr. Alverez's mouth and even indicated that Mr. Alverez "talked quite well." R. 88:16-
17, 19. The officers did not see Mr. Alverez put anything into his mouth. Officer 
Walling asked to search Mr. Alverez's mouth not because he had probable cause to 
believe Mr. Alverez was carrying drugs but because it is a standard question he asks of 
those he perceives to be drug dealers. In sum, when Mr. Alverez began to swallow, the 
officers were acting on no more than a bare suspicion that Mr. Alverez had drugs in his 
mouth. The totality of these factors did not amount to the probable cause needed to 
justify a forcible search of Mr. Alverez. 
Even if the officers had a clear indication that drugs would be found in Mr. 
Alverez's mouth, exigent circumstances did not exist justifying their forcible search. As 
argued in Appellant's Opening Brief, the only evidence the State presented was the 
officer's belief that if Mr. Alverez was carrying drugs in his mouth the drugs would be 
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packaged in balloons. Further, Officer Steed testified that the significance of the bottle 
of water in the car was that M[i]n the past when [he] had been involved in an initiation of, 
say traffic stops that contain person that [he] believed to have narcotics [he has] seen 
them use that water to swallow drugs that they contained in their mouths." R. 88:29. 
In Appellant's Opening Brief, State v. Hodson, 907 P.2d 1155, 1158 (Utah 1995) 
(Hodson II), is cited for support that swallowing balloons filled with narcotics does not 
give rise to exigent circumstances. The State argues that Appellant's reliance on Hodson 
II is misplaced because Hodson II only held that the officers's use offeree was 
unreasonable. State Brief 25. While it is true that the Supreme Court only overruled 
this Court's determination of the reasonableness of the search procedure, the Court's 
review of the State's "justification for the force used" is instructive. The State argued 
that the justification for the use offeree was "the need to preserve evidence and protect 
defendant from harm." Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1158. The Supreme Court stated: 
The justification for the force use in this case is the need to preserve 
evidence and protect defendant from harm. However, we do not know, 
and cannot ascertain from the record, any of the necessary fact which might 
have supported a reasonable fear by the officers that swallowing the 
plastic-wrapped chips would render their contents nondiscoverable or 
harmful to defendant. There is considerable indication in the cases cited by 
both parties that drug dealers commonly seek to secrete drugs by means of 
swallowing, and it does not seem likely that they would routinely risk their 
own safety or lives. Furthermore, drugs ingested in this manner can only 
follow two paths: Either they will pass through the system intact because of 
their packaging, or they will be absorbed into the bloodstream of the 
swallower. In either event, they are susceptible to identification and 
recovery in supervised, nonviolent post-arrest settings. 
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Id 
The Supreme Court's reasoning of the likelihood of drug dealers risking their own 
safety and the only "two paths" drugs swallowed can take strongly supports Appellant's 
argument that exigent circumstances did not exist in this case. This reasoning also 
supports that the officers use of force was not justified in this case. Therefore the trial 
court erred in denying Mr. Alverez's motion to suppress. See also Appellant's Opening 
Brief 34-44. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons and those more fully set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief, 
Mr. Alverez, respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress, and reverse his conviction. 
SUBMITTED this \& day of October, 2004. 
/ ^ / V 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
STEVEN G. SHAPIRO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
ERNESTO ALVEREZ, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 031904214 FS 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AUGUST 29, 2003 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
F'UO DISTRICT COURT 
Third Jud.cial District' 
^ 2 s 2004 
• ^ SALT LAKE COUNTY 
inputy C/eriT 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
 FILED 
1775 East Ellen Way UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 MAR 2 9 2004 
K
 i? 5 g | »t* 
liMQ)3?^ 
_ * 5!:t ? SS 
simply just both grabbed his arm and leaned him forward and i 
i 
i 
told him to spit it out, that's what the testimony was, that 
was reasonable. The State submits it. ; 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
I 
I'm going to deny your motion, Mr. Shapiro, on the 
following grounds. There is a totality of the circumstances. ! 
I don't believe that the State was in a position to require or 
even to obtain a warrant. There are no premises that are ' 
t 
i 
identified in this matter, there are no - the vehicle was under 
suspicion, but I don't know how that was other than the two 
short term stays that the officer testified there are some | 
other involvement that we don't know about. i 
I give little weight - weight but very little weight 
to the water bottle and to the image in the car, but I can see 
under the totality of the circumstances that - and what turns 
this against you, Mr. Shapiro, is at the time that Mr. Alverez j 
was asked if he would open his mouth, he doesn't open his mouth 
and starts to, in the officer's eyes, destroy evidence, and I 
believe at that point, if for no other reason at that point 
they had reasonable basis to believe a crime was being 
committed in their presence. 
So if the State would prepare the findings on that 
and what do you want to do on this one? 
MR. SHAPIRO: Well, judge, when I sought to make my 
counter-response I was -
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